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Abstract
This paper has two closely related aims. The main aim is to lay out one specific way in which the 
derivational aspects of a grammatical theory can contribute to the cognitive claims made by that 
theory, to demonstrate that it is not only a theory’s posited representations that testable cognitive 
hypotheses derive from. This requires, however, an understanding of grammatical derivations 
that initially appears somewhat unnatural in the context of modern generative syntax. The second 
aim is to argue that this impression is misleading: certain accidents of the way our theories 
developed over the decades have led to a situation that makes it artificially difficult to apply 
the understanding of derivations that I adopt to modern generative grammar. Comparisons with 
other derivational formalisms and with earlier generative grammars serve to clarify the question 
of how derivational systems can, in general, constitute hypotheses about mental phenomena.
Keywords: syntax; minimalist grammars; transformational grammars; derivations; representa-
tions; derivation trees; probabilistic grammars
Resum. Quin tipus d’hipòtesi cognitiva és una teoria derivativa de la gramàtica?
Aquest article té dos objectius estretament relacionats. L’objectiu principal és exposar una 
forma específica en la qual els aspectes derivatius d’una teoria gramatical poden contribuir a 
les afirmacions cognitives realitzades per aquesta teoria, per demostrar que no són només les 
representacions plantejades d’una teoria de les que es deriven hipòtesis cognitives testables. Això 
requereix, però, una comprensió de les derivacions gramaticals que, inicialment, semblen poc 
naturals en el context de la sintaxi generativa moderna. El segon objectiu és argumentar que aquesta 
impressió és enganyosa: certs accidents de la manera com les nostres teories es van desenvolupar al 
llarg de les dècades han donat lloc a una situació que fa artificialment difícil aplicar la comprensió 
de les derivacions que adopto a la gramàtica generativa moderna. Les comparacions amb altres 
formalismes derivatius i amb gramàtiques generatives anteriors serveixen per aclarir la qüestió de 
com els sistemes derivats poden, en general, constituir hipòtesis sobre fenòmens mentals.
Paraules clau: sintaxi; gramàtiques minimalistes; gramàtiques transformacionals; derivacions; 
representacions; arbres de derivació; gramàtiques probabilístiques
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Two kinds of theories of natural language syntax can be distinguished: representa-
tional theories and derivational theories. A representational theory posits some set 
of constraints, and defines a well-formed syntactic object to be one that satisfies 
all of the constraints. A derivational theory instead takes the form of a nondeter-
ministic mechanical procedure, for example a symbol-rewriting procedure or a 
procedure that builds larger objects out of smaller ones, and defines a well-formed 
syntactic object to be one that is generated by this procedure.
The mentalistic claims of a representational theory are relatively clear: it is gen-
erally understood that when a speaker comprehends or produces a sentence, a repre-
sentational theory predicts that a corresponding well-formed syntactic object (say, 
a tree structure with the sentence’s words at its leaves) is grasped in the speaker’s 
mind. With a representational theory, nothing is said about how a speaker might 
go about constructing (a representation of) this syntactic object, and the linguist’s 
everyday use of the theory also does not involve any descriptions of procedures 
that construct syntactic objects.
The situation for a derivational theory, however, is slightly less straightforward. 
Consider for example the mainstream contemporary derivational theories deriving 
from Chomsky (1995) and subsequent work. It is natural to assume that a speaker 
grasps the syntactic object that is the end product of the derivational process 
corresponding to the sentence being comprehended/produced, i.e. the tree structures 
that are routinely used to illustrate proposals in this literature. But if that is the 
extent of a derivational theory’s mental commitments, what is the scientific role 
of the derivational procedure? If we have an existing derivational theory T1, and 
an alternative theory T2 proposes a derivational procedure that differs from that of 
T1 but yields the same set of well-formed syntactic objects, then is there any clear 
sense in which we should understand the two theories to be different? If they are 
not different — i.e. if the procedural component of a derivational theory does not 
contribute to its empirical bottom line — then why bother with the derivational 
procedures at all? If they are different, then how are they different, i.e. how does 
the procedural component of a derivational theory contribute to the theory’s 
empirical bottom line?
Answering this last question is the main goal of this paper: I will lay out a way 
of understanding derivational theories according to which the derivational process 
itself, in addition to the end result of this process, plays a part in determining the 
empirical predictions of a theory. For concreteness, I will illustrate by showing at 
the end of the paper — in entirely artificial, and artificially small-scale, case stud-
ies — how derivational operations play a part in determining predictions about 
sentence comprehension difficulty, and predictions about which grammar a learner 
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will choose in response to some collection of input. The main point I want to stress, 
however, is not the (fairly arbitrary) particulars of either of these case studies, 
but rather the general understanding of derivational frameworks which makes a 
derivational process a first-class theoretical object which can underpin empirical 
predictions just as naturally as the static objects in a representational theory can. 
The key idea is that we can identify an atemporal structured object — typically, a 
derivation tree — that encapsulates the derivational process and yet is static in the 
same sense that syntactic objects in representational theories are.
This point is an attempt to address the issues raised by some who have ques-
tioned the role of derivational processes in modern generative syntax (Sag & 
Wasow 2011; Jackendoff 2011; Ferreira 2005; Phillips & Lewis 2013). This criti-
cism appears to stem largely from the fact that, in practice, descriptions of how a 
particular theory accounts for some relevant data rarely requires making reference 
to the derivational operations1 posited by the theory; very often, the final con-
structed syntactic object is all we need to consider when working out the empirical 
predictions of a theory, and it seems that any number of different ways of describ-
ing how that object is constructed would leave the account intact.
I will suggest that this impression is due to a perhaps unfortunate quirk in mod-
ern generative syntax: the fact that the end product of a derivational process very 
often encodes a large amount (or all) of the derivational process itself, for example 
in the form of co-indexed traces or copies. A clearer understanding of how deri-
vational grammars in general can constitute hypotheses about mental phenomena 
can be achieved by considering other derivational systems that do not have this 
quirk, and where it is therefore easy to see the role of the derivational process itself 
(because this role is not duplicated by representational devices). With more light 
thus shed on the kind of mental significance a derivational process can in princi-
ple take on, we will be better placed to ask (i) what it would mean to ascribe this 
same kind of mental significance to the derivational processes typically invoked in 
modern generative syntax, and (ii) whether doing so is consistent with the standard 
ways in which linguists already work with these theories. In answer to the second 
question, I will argue that it is not only consistent with standard practices but fur-
thermore is, given the way our theories have developed over the decades, a very 
natural understanding of syntactic derivations.
In Section 1 I will review in more detail the distinguishing features of represen-
tational and derivational theories of grammar, and the questions that are sometimes 
raised about the mental significance of derivational processes. In doing so I will 
discuss the abovementioned quirk of modern generative syntax, and the way the 
questions are clarified by considering other systems that do not share this quirk. 
I will then turn to minimalist syntax more specifically in Section 2. The goal here 
will be to identify the static representations (namely, derivation trees) that encap-
1. This is not to deny that we sometimes talk about, for example, a certain sentence being unacceptable 
“because this movement step violates such-and-such constraint”. But due to the presence of devices 
like traces or copies, this appeal to the processes themselves is often dispensable. Much more on 
this point in Section 1.3 below.
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sulate this kind of theory’s derivational processes. I will do this for two subtly dif-
ferent variants of minimalist theory: one which takes merge and move to be distinct 
primitive operations, and one which unifies them into a single operation. These 
two variants that I will introduce differ only in their derivational processes, not in 
the syntactic objects that they construct. In Section 3 I will then present case stud-
ies where the two variants nonetheless make distinct predictions in two empirical 
domains: sentence comprehension difficulty, and grammar selection by a learner. 
Since the two variants’ differences concern only their derivational processes, this 
serves to demonstrate that the procedural component of a derivational system con-
tributes to a theory’s empirical bottom line. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
1. Representations, derivations and derived expressions
1.1. Purely representational and purely derivational systems
Caricaturing at least slightly, Figure 1 illustrates one possible conception of the rela-
tionship between a representational system and a derivational system. On the left 
is the static syntactic structure assigned to the sentence ‘Kim gives Sandy Fido’ in 
HPSG, one of the more widely-known representational theories of grammar (Pollard 
& Sag 1994: 33). This syntactic object is well-formed by virtue of satisfying the 
relevant array of constraints. As mentioned above, the mental commitments of this 
kind of theory are relatively clear: in comprehending or producing this sentence, a 
representation of this syntactic object is grasped2 in the speaker’s mind. By virtue of 
the fact that this grasped syntactic object is well-formed, the theory predicts that this 
sentence will be judged to be acceptable. And perhaps there are other predictions 
that one might make on the basis of other properties of this syntactic object: to take 
an overly simplistic example, one might predict that the time taken to comprehend 
this sentence will be some function of the size of this object.
On the right of Figure 1, for comparison, is a sketch of how a derivation on 
modern minimalist grammar might be thought of. There is a final derived expres-
sion of the familiar sort, the tree with yield ‘the dog will chase it’ shown at the 
top. One possible thought — although I will argue against this — is that this tree 
is the thing in this derivational system that best corresponds, as indicated by the 
horizontal dashed lines, to HPSG’s static syntactic object on the left. Since this 
is a derivational framework, however, there is more to the picture than just this: 
there is also a derivational process which is taken to have given rise to this derived 
expression, as shown underneath. (For reasons that should become clear, I am 
writing them underneath the derived expression, despite the usual idea that these 
other pieces of the picture precede the derived expression. This usual notion of 
precedence is reflected in the arrows.) The layout of the diagram is intended to 
2. I will assume that the intended meaning of this term, while difficult to spell out explicitly, is suffi-
ciently clear. Since the questions I aim to address here largely centre on the difficulties that come 
with adopting derivational as opposed to representational grammars, I am taking as my concrete 
goal to show that there are no such additional difficulties. Fleshing out the notion that I am calling 
“grasping” is a difficulty that will affect derivational and representational theories equally.
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emphasize the way this perception of a derivational system makes the derivational 
process seem like something “extra”, and perhaps even something superfluous, in 
comparison with a representational system: there is nothing in the illustration of the 
representational system on the left which corresponds to this derivational process. 
So what is it there for?
I will argue that instead of this view, we should consider the derivational pro-
cess as a whole (including, but not limited to, the final derived expression) to be 
the analog of the static representation in a representational system. This shift in 
perspective is reflected in the shift from Figure 1 to Figure 2. The arrows that are 
usually thought of (and can still be, harmlessly) as indicating a kind of precedence 
are now simply part of the object that a speaker must grasp; the formal relationships 
amongst expressions that they express are part of the information that a speaker 
must recover.3
3. The difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 perhaps corresponds to the difference between what 
Phillips & Lewis (2013) call the “extensionalist” view of derivations and the “formalist” view, 
respectively. The formalist view can be seen as an intermediate position between two extremes: 
Figure 1. A view that I will argue against: only the end product of a derivational process is 
given the easily-understandable empirical status corresponding to that of a static represen-
tation in a non-derivational theory.
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It will be useful to establish some terminology for what follows. I will use the 
term expression for an object of the sort that might be manipulated or inspected by 
a grammar: either checked for consistency with some representational constraint, 
or used as input to or produced as output from some derivational operation. I will 
show expressions inside thick, rounded boxes throughout. I will use object as a 
much more general term for any kind of structured representation that a mind might 
grasp. Expressions are objects, but not all objects are expressions. In a representa-
tional setting, there are no relevant objects to consider besides expressions them-
selves, and so the object to be grasped upon encountering the sentence ‘Kim gives 
Sandy Fido’ is simply the expression itself that appears on the left of Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. The difference between these two figures is that Figure 1 expresses a view 
where, in the derivational system, the object to be grasped is the single expression 
shown within the horizontal dashed lines; whereas Figure 2 expresses the view that 
the object to be grasped is an object of a different sort, an object encoding certain 
relations among expressions. This object is a derivation (and can be represented 
on paper by a derivation tree).4
A clear illustration of the perspective presented in Figure 2 is provided by the 
various kinds of categorial grammar. In this framework, the categories into which 
the extensionalist view, according to which individual derivational steps are not understood to be 
making any mentalistic commitments at all, and the “literalist” view, according to which individual 
derivational steps are interpreted very directly as hypothesized real-time mental operations. From 
the perspective in Figure 2 that I aim to elucidate here, linking hypotheses can be formulated that 
expose derivational operations to empirical scrutiny (unlike the extensionalist view), but these link-
ing hypotheses do not include the straightforward one that makes immediate and direct predictions 
about real-time mental operations (as is the case on the literalist view).
  Phillips and Lewis mention the intermediate formalist option only relatively briefly, and focus 
mainly on the literalist and extensionalist extremes, without going into much detail about what a 
fleshed-out formalist position would look like. But the notion of a static atemporal derivation tree, 
mentioned above, corresponds closely to the collection of formally related structures that Phillips 
and Lewis mention.
4. Some readers, especially formally-minded ones, might object at this point that the tension I am set-
ting up can be straightforwardly resolved by eliminating (or just neglecting to make) this distinction 
between expressions and objects; derivation trees can just as well be defined model-theoretically 
(i.e. “any derivational system can be converted to an equivalent representational one”), and then 
the choice of Figure 2 over Figure 1 is obvious. I agree wholeheartedly: my aim in this paper is in 
large part to lay out exactly this line of reasoning in an accessible and contextualized manner, since 
it seems to gain little traction in the linguistics literature. I adopt the expression/object terminology 
as a way to try to engage with the intuitions that make derivational and representational systems 
appear starkly different.
  It is worth pointing out, however, that — as this acknowledgement might suggest — the perspective 
on derivations that I end up arguing for in this paper is entirely standard within the theoretical compu-
tational linguistics community (and entirely mundane formally). This includes the work on formalized 
minimalist grammars that I draw on in Sections 2 and 3; see for example work by Kobele (2010, 
2011, 2012), Graf (2011, 2013, 2017) and Stabler (2011, 2013), all of which takes derivation trees 
(virtually without comment) as the central object of interest. The same can be said for the formal work 
on tree-adjoining grammars (e.g. Joshi & Schabes 1997), where an analogous relationship between 
derivation structure and derived expressions arose earlier. It is no coincidence that these formalisms, 
where this relationship is kept clear, do not share with mainstream minimalist the unfortunate quirk 
of duplicating derivational history in derived expressions, as I discuss in Section 1.3.
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lexical items are classified can be complex, and a small number of very general 
combinatory rules apply in a manner that is guided by these potentially complex 
categories. For example, using the lexical items shown in (1), the two general 
rules of forwards and backwards function application can be applied recursively 
to construct the sentence ‘the dog chased the cat’. This is typically illustrated using 
a format like (2), but an equivalent representation that follows the conventions I 
adopt throughout this paper is the one in (3).
(1) the :: NP/N
 dog :: N
 cat :: N
 chased :: (S\NP)/NP
(2) 
Figure 2. The view that I will argue for: the derivational process itself, in its entirety, is the 
relevant object.
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(3) 
 
A distinctive feature of this kind of grammar is that the expressions being 
manipulated are essentially unstructured: they are things like ‘the dog :: NP’, i.e. a 
string5 paired with a category, where the category dictates how the expression can 
be used by any subsequent operations. So the derivational process indicated in (2) 
and (3) is one which works with the “ingredients” shown in (1), and produces as 
a result the expression ‘the dog chased the cat :: S’. Notice that the final derived 
expression is an object of the same sort as the ingredient expressions in (1), i.e. a 
string with a category. As Jacobson (2007) describes this kind of system, “there 
is no room to state constraints on structured representations. For ‘structure’ is not 
something that the grammar ever gets to see”. In the terminology introduced above, 
this is to say that the expressions here, the things that the grammar can “see” — 
inspect, manipulate, whatever — have no structure; the only structured object is 
the derivation.
The crucial point here is that it would make little sense to suppose that the 
object that is “grasped” by a speaker upon encountering the sentence ‘the dog 
chased the cat’ is simply the one constructed by this derivational process, namely 
the expression ‘the dog chased the cat :: S’.
For the theory to be doing any work at all, there must at the very least be some 
difference between what the speaker does upon encountering ‘the dog chased the 
cat’ and what he/she does upon encountering ‘cat dog the the chased’. But this is not 
a difference between ‘the dog chased the cat :: S’ being well-formed and ‘cat dog 
the the chased :: S’ being ill-formed relative to some constraints on representations 
— there are no such constraints. Rather, the difference is that in the case of ‘the dog 
chased the cat’, there is some derivational process that produces the expression ‘the 
dog chased the cat :: S’, whereas in the case of ‘cat dog the the chased’ there is no 
derivational process that produces the expression ‘cat dog the the chased :: S’. So 
what is grasped by a speaker encountering ‘the dog chased the cat’ is some repre-
sentation like (3): something that encodes the relationships between the ingredients 
like ‘the :: NP/N’ and ‘dog :: N’ and the things that are built from them like ‘the 
5. Of course there is also a semantic representation that accompanies each such expression, so they are 
really triples comprising a string, a meaning and a category. I will leave out the meaning component 
only for simplicity (an omission that is perhaps particularly egregious given that a distinguishing 
property of categorial grammars is the manner in which the composition of strings and the compo-
sition of meanings take place in sync with each other). The crucial point remains that these objects 
do not have any syntactic structure, in contrast to the case of transformational grammars.
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dog :: NP’. It is clear, then, that in this kind of system the derivational process is 
doing some real work, in such a way that it makes sense to construe the derivational 
process itself as the object that corresponds to the representations to be grasped in 
the setting of a representational theory; see Figure 3.
What makes the importance of the derivation so clear in categorial grammars 
is the fact that, as emphasized above, the expressions constructed by these deriva-
tions are just strings (with categories) that have no significant structure. Thus there 
is, roughly speaking, “nothing but the derivation”, and so when it comes to asking 
what the theory says about (what a speaker will do upon encountering) a particular 
sentence, the derivation itself is the only thing to look to. But the general point can 
be carried over to systems where the derived expressions have more structure, for 
example, if they are trees rather than strings: in such systems, it is less obvious 
that it is necessary to treat the derivation with the significance indicated in Figure 
2 and Figure 3, but there is no obstacle to doing so if it is useful. My goal in this 
paper is roughly to show that doing so in the context of modern generative syntax 
is both useful and, implicitly at least, even standard.
As another example, note that a familiar context-free grammar (CFG) can be 
understood as a device that generates unstructured objects much like the way cat-
egorial grammars do. Specifically, the CFG in (4) can be understood as a collection 
of statements that allow the expression ‘the dog chased the cat :: S’ to be generated 
by the derivational process illustrated in (5). As above, this is to be understood as a 
record of the fact that ‘the :: D’ combined with ‘cat :: N’ to produce the expression 
‘the cat :: NP’, which in turn combined with ‘chased :: V’ and so on.
(4) S → NP VP
 NP → D N
 VP → V NP
 D → the 
 N → dog
 N → cat
 V → chased
Figure 3. Taking categorial grammar as our derivational theory, it is very natural to adopt the 
view in Figure 2 rather than that in Figure 1.
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(5) 
From this point of view, a rule such as ‘NP → D N’ is a statement about what 
can be combined with what (to produce what), and a CFG does not derive struc-
tured expressions any more than a categorial grammar does. Accordingly, in order 
for a CFG understood this way to serve as a model of linguistic competence, it is 
natural to take the derivation itself to be what is “grasped” by speakers, just as it 
is with categorial grammars.
This entirely derivational approach is not the only construal of CFGs, however, 
and perhaps is not even the most common one. Moving to the other extreme, we can 
instead consider an entirely representational construal. On this view the rules in (4) 
are understood not as statements specifying allowable derivational operations, but 
as well-formedness conditions on static expressions (McCawley 1968), just like in 
HPSG. Expressions of the sort dealt with in (3) and (5) — namely things like ‘the 
dog :: NP’ and ‘chased the cat :: VP’ — don’t contain enough information for these 
well-formedness conditions to take their intended effect, and so on this construal 
we must take the expressions that the grammar works with to be trees. One such 
tree that is well-formed according to the grammar in (4) is shown in (6).
(6)
On this view, the rule ‘NP → D N’ is not a statement about what can be com-
bined with what, or about anything that an abstract derivational procedure can 
or cannot do. It is a statement that says, of a static tree-shaped expression, “If a 
node is labeled NP and has two daughters, the left of which is labeled D and the 
right of which is labeled N, then that node is well-formed”. If all the parts of a 
tree are well-formed according to this interpretation of the grammar, then the tree 
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is well-formed. A representation of this static tree is what is taken to be grasped 
by a speaker upon encountering the sentence ‘the dog chased the cat’, in just the 
same way that the static HPSG representation on the left-hand side of Figure 1 
and Figure 2 is.
Of course, these two construals of the CFG in (4) are barely distinguishable (if 
at all) as cognitive hypotheses. This feeling that they are one and the same is based 
on the assumption that the derivational process in (5) can serve as an object to be 
grasped, so that the two construals stand in the trivial relationship to each other 
illustrated in Figure 4. Denying this role to derivations themselves would force us to 
conclude that the construal illustrated in (5) differed significantly from the construal 
illustrated in (6): we would end up with the relationship between the two illustrated 
Figure 4. The equivalence of the representational and derivational construals of CFGs rests 
on allowing the entire derivation to “count”, as in Figure 2.
Figure 5. Restricting ourselves to understanding derivational theories as in Figure 1 would 
entail that the representational and derivational construals of CFGs were not equivalent.
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in Figure 5, where only the representational construal in (6) is sensible because, 
as discussed in relation to the categorial grammar example, it makes no sense to 
suppose that the object to be grasped is simply ‘the dog chased the cat :: S’. I will 
argue that we should reject the view of modern minimalist derivations illustrated in 
Figure 1 for essentially the same reason that we reject the view of CFGs illustrated 
on the right of Figure 5.
1.2. Mixed systems
Recall from above that when a grammar deals with expressions that have more 
structure than strings — for example, trees — it is less obviously necessary that 
the derivation must take on the significance indicated in Figure 2 and Figure 3, but 
nonetheless still possible. The question is whether the possibility of doing so is 
useful. As an illustration of what doing so looks like when it is not useful, we can 
consider (somewhat perversely) a construal of the CFG in (4) according to which 
it specifies a derivational process (like in (5), but unlike in (6)) that works with 
structured expressions (like in (6), but unlike in (5)). A derivation in this unwieldy 
and redundant system is shown in (7).
(7)
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Now the rule ‘NP → D N’, for example, says two mutually redundant things. 
First, with regard to the derivational process, it says that it is possible to put togeth-
er a tree with a root node labeled D and a tree with a root node labeled N, to form 
a tree with a new root node labeled NP. Second, with regard to the structured 
expressions that are derived, it says that a node labeled NP is well-formed if it has 
two daughters, a left daughter labeled D and a right daughter labeled N. These “two 
things” that the rule says are redundant since, of course, they are really just the 
one thing said in two different ways. So the redundancy stems from the fact that 
a CFG really only has one thing to say, and while that one thing can be expressed 
and enforced either derivationally as in (5) or representationally as in (6), having 
the rule enforce it in both ways is redundant.
The crucial point to note is that because of this redundancy, it is plausible to 
take the final expression derived by the entire derivational process, namely the 
tree at the root node in (7), as the object that is grasped by a speaker, since — in 
contrast to the situation illustrated earlier in (5) and Figure 5 — grasping the entire 
derivational process provides no additional information beyond what is provided 
by grasping the final derived expression. If all derivational systems that worked 
with structured expressions were redundant in this way, then the conception I 
began with in Figure 1 would be reasonable. But my aim here is to show that this 
is not the case.
I will use the term purely derivational for systems like (3) and (5), where 
“everything the grammar says” is expressed derivationally; and purely represen-
tational for systems like (6), where everything is expressed representationally. The 
system illustrated in (7) is neither purely derivational nor purely representational 
— it is what I will call a mixed system, since the grammar makes both represen-
tational and derivational statements.6 So to repeat the crucial point, although this 
first example of a mixed system has the property that the representational and 
derivational aspects are mutually redundant, there are other mixed systems that 
are not redundant in this way — instead, some parts of the important work are 
accomplished derivationally, and other parts are accomplished representationally.
One example of a mixed but non-redundant system is the framework of early 
transformational grammars in Miller and Chomsky (1963) and Chomsky (1965). 
A clear illustration of this comes from the famous comparison between the two 
sentences in (8) and (9) (see Miller & Chomsky 1963: 476-480).
(8) John is easy to please.
(9) John is eager to please.
6. Note that it does not make sense to ask whether the set of rules in (4) itself is purely derivation-
al or purely representational (or mixed). It depends on whether those rules are interpreted as 
well-formedness conditions on static representations, or as statements about what can be derived 
from what.
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Each of these sentences is derived by base-generating two monoclausal “under-
lying P-markers”, and then manipulating and combining these P-markers (these 
are the expressions that this system works with) to arrive at a single “derived 
P-marker”, as illustrated in (10) and (11).
(10)  (11)
Like the understanding of CFGs illustrated in (7), this is a derivational system 
that works with structured expressions (specifically, trees, rather than strings), so 
this is a mixed system. The grammar licenses certain derivational steps that relate 
P-markers to one another — specifically, certain transformations, such as the trans-
formation that combines two S-rooted trees and the transformation that fronts an 
NP from an embedded object position to overwrite ‘it’ — and also imposes certain 
representational constraints (“surface filters”7) on the eventual derived expression. 
7. I am taking some liberties with the historical details here: transformational grammars generally did 
not include surface filters until after the 1960s, but the fact that they were soon introduced leaves 
the main point unaffected.
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But unlike the first example of a mixed system in (7), this is not redundant: in this 
case, the work that is performed derivationally and the work that is performed 
representationally are separate, and accordingly grasping the entire derivational 
process provides more information than does grasping the final derived expres-
sion alone.
Furthermore, it is clear that the intended interpretation of these early trans-
formational grammars did involve the idea that a speaker encountering (8) or (9) 
grasped the entire derivational process illustrated in (10) or (11). This pair of sen-
tences provides a dramatic illustration of this: the interesting point about this pair 
is that speakers understand them to have different structures in some important 
sense — as evidenced by the fact that speakers understand ‘John’ to be the pleasee 
in (8) but the pleaser in (9), and the fact that speakers know there is an expletive-‘it’ 
variant of (8) but not (9), etc. The crucial point to note is that the theory would not 
provide any account of these differences if one supposed that the object grasped by 
speakers were simply the eventual derived structures, because these two structures 
are identical (modulo the alternation of ‘easy’/‘eager’ itself), as (10) and (11) make 
clear. In order to provide any explanation for the different ways in which speak-
ers treat these two sentences, the derivational processes posited by the theory, i.e. 
the entire tree structures shown in (10) and (11), must be the objects thought to be 
grasped by speakers. This point is not only logically necessary in hindsight, but 
was clearly the intended interpretation at the time:
[…] we see that the grammatical relations of ‘John’ and ‘please’ in [(8)] and [(9)] are 
represented in the intuitively correct way in the structural descriptions provided by a 
transformational grammar. The structural description of [(8)] consists of the two under-
lying P-markers [at the bottom of (10)] and the derived P-marker [at the top of (10)] (as 
well as a record of the transformational history T1, T4, T5). The structural description of 
[(9)] consists of the two underlying P-markers [at the bottom of (11)] and the derived 
P-marker [at the top of (11)] (along with the transformational history T1, T2, T3). Thus the 
structural description of [(8)] contains the information that ‘John’ in [(8)] is the object 
of ‘please’ in the underlying P-marker [at the bottom right of (10)]; and the structural 
description of [(9)] contains the information that ‘John’ in [(9)] is the subject of ‘please’ 
in the underlying P-marker [at the bottom right of (11)].
[one component of the perceptual model] will utilize the full resources of the trans-
formational grammar to provide a structural description, consisting of a set of P-markers 
and a transformational history, in which deeper grammatical relations and other struc-
tural information are represented.
Miller & Chomsky (1963: 479-480)
This kind of transformational grammar is therefore a mixed system where the 
final derived expression does not provide all of the grammatically relevant informa-
tion — in essentially the same way as was noted earlier with respect to the purely 
derivational systems in (3) and (5). So having trees instead of strings as the derived 
expressions does not automatically make the derivational process redundant.
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1.3. What kind of system is modern transformational syntax?
Against the backdrop of these distinctions — between purely derivational/repre-
sentational and mixed systems, and between redundant and non-redundant mixed 
systems — we can now ask what kind of system contemporary versions of trans-
formational grammar are. Clearly they are mixed systems of some sort, since they 
are specified derivationally and work with structured expressions, so the question 
is whether the derivational process that derives a structured expression provides 
additional information that is not encoded in the derived expression itself, like in 
(10) and (11), or is redundant, like in (7). To the extent that the derivational process 
provides additional information that theories appeal to, the background assumption 
that researchers are working with must be the view outlined in Figure 2 (because 
the view in Figure 1 would put this information “out of bounds”).
It is at this point that we must contend with the “unfortunate quirk” of modern 
transformational grammars mentioned in the introduction. Over the decades a num-
ber of representational devices have been introduced that encode in the final derived 
expression information that previously was encoded only in underlying phrase mark-
ers, such as traces/copies and co-indexed silent elements like PRO. This has created 
a situation where, in very many cases, the eventual derived expression does uniquely 
identify the history of transformational operations (essentially, merge and move steps) 
that derived it. In such cases, recovering the derivational process itself is redundant, in 
much the same way as it is in (7); and the prevalence of such cases might create the 
impression that researchers are working with the view in Figure 1. But I will argue 
that this does not seem to be the case in general: even in the minimalist era, there are 
clear instances of proposals that only “make sense” under the view that the entire 
derivation is relevant (Figure 2), in ways that are formally analogous to the ‘easy to 
please’/‘eager to please’ analysis discussed above. I discuss some of these in Section 
1.3.1. A natural and important question to ask, admittedly, is why such cases have 
become so rare, i.e. why derivational information so frequently ends up “duplicated” 
via representational devices. I will argue in Section 1.3.2 that this is simply the result 
of historical accidents that have led to a theoretical architecture that makes thinking 
about these questions unnecessarily difficult.
1.3.1. Sensitivity to derivational history
The most obviously relevant development since the system illustrated in (10)/
(11) is the introduction of traces. One possibility is that the introduction of traces 
coincided with a wholesale adjustment away from the perspective where complete 
derivations are the relevant objects, towards a view where only the derived struc-
ture matters. Two indications that this was not the case can be seen in arguments 
motivating the Strict Cycle Condition (Freidin 1978, 1999) and in the proposal by 
Lebeaux (1988, 2000) to account for anti-reconstruction effects by allowing late 
adjunction. More recently still, movement has generally been taken to leave behind 
not just a trace of the moved constituent, but rather a full copy of it. This has the 
consequence of duplicating still more information between the derivational process 
and its output, but even this development does not seem to have coincided with a 
switch to a view where only the derived structure matters. Appeals to information 
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that cannot be gleaned from derived structure can be seen in, for example, Lasnik 
(1999) and McCloskey (2002).
As a first example, consider the argument for the Strict Cycle Condition based 
on the unacceptability of (12) (Chomsky 1973). Freidin (1978: 524) (see also 
Freidin 1999: 100) points out that in the context of the assumption that intermedi-
ate traces of successive cyclic movement can be deleted, one needs both subjacency 
and the Strict Cycle Condition to rule out such a sentence.
(12) *What did he wonder who ate?
There are two relevant derivations to consider: 
(13) he wondered [who ate what]
 he wondered [whoi ti ate what] 
 whatj he wondered [whoi ti ate tj]
(14) he wondered [who ate what]
 he wondered [whatj who ate tj] 
 whatj he wondered [tj who ate tj] 
 whatj he wondered [whoi ti ate tj]
In (13), first ‘who’ moves to the embedded SpecCP position, and then ‘what’ is 
forced to move in a single step to the matrix SpecCP position, violating subjacency. 
But on the assumption that intermediate A-bar traces can be deleted/overwritten, 
the fact that the derivation in (13) violates subjacency is not sufficient to rule 
out the sentence, because the derivation in (14) provides a way around subja-
cency: move ‘what’ to the matrix SpecCP in two subjacency-obeying steps, and 
then move ‘who’ into the embedded SpecCP position (overwriting the trace of 
‘what’). The additional constraint that is needed is the Strict Cyclic Condition, 
which prevents the order of operations in (14).
The important point for our purposes is that the two derivations in (13) and (14) 
produce the same final derived expression, as the last lines of each make clear. Thus 
it would make no sense to point out that, without the Strict Cycle Condition, (13) 
would be ruled out as desired but (14) would not, unless the things being ruled out 
and ruled in were derivations. Put differently: if we suppose that the expression on 
the last line of (13) is what the theory says is grasped by a speaker upon encounter-
ing the string in (12), then it would make no sense to say that although this expres-
sion is correctly classified as ungrammatical, something more must be added to our 
theory to rule out (the expression on the last line of) (14). As in the ‘easy’/‘eager’ 
example, the final derived expression underdetermines the entities that the theory 
is evidently taken to actually care about — namely, the derivations themselves.8
8. Freidin (1978) notes that a ban on the deletion of traces achieves the same result. But this does not 
change the fact that the argument for the Strict Cycle sketched here, which relies on the view that 
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As another example of this kind of situation, consider the analysis of the con-
trast in (15) proposed by Lebeaux (1988, 2000).
(15) a. Which pictures [that Johni took] did hei like? 
 b. *Whose claim [that Johni took pictures] did hei deny?
Lebeaux’s influential account of this contrast involved supposing that the rela-
tive clause in (15a) could be added after the wh-movement transformation that 
fronts ‘which report’, since the relative clause is not required to be present in 
d-structure. The bracketed clause in (15b), however, being a complement rather 
than an adjunct, does not have this flexibility, and therefore has no way to avoid the 
Condition C violation induced by the co-indexed matrix subject ‘he’ at d-structure.
The crucial point for our purposes here is that this distinction between the 
derivation of (15a) that circumvents Condition C and the derivation of (15b) that 
violates it was not encoded in the S-structure phrase markers that were assumed at 
the time. The two trees shown in (16) do not themselves differ in any respect that 
is relevant to compliance with Condition C.9
(16) a.
  
derivations are the objects being ruled in and ruled out, was taken as a valid pattern of reasoning 
regarding the consequences of not having such a ban. Freidin in fact argues for the approach that 
disallows trace deletion rather than the one that enforces the Strict Cycle Condition. The shift from 
deletable traces to non-deletable traces can be seen as part of the broader trend towards more and 
more “substantive” residues of movement, ensuring that more and more derivational history is 
encoded in the final derived object, culminating with the full-fledged copy theory of movement.
9. Lebeaux (2000: 107-108) is quite explicit about this: “There are two possible derivations for [(15a)]. 
In one, Adjoin-α applies prior to Move-α. […] In this derivation … Condition C will apply to the 
intermediate structure, ruling it out. […] There is, however, another derivation [in which] Move-α 
[…] applies before Adjoin-α. This derivation gives rise to the appropriate s-structure as well.” 
(emphasis added).
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 b.
  
The theory would not provide any account for the fact that speakers’ judge-
ments of (15a) differ from their judgements of (15b) if it were assumed that speak-
ers grasped only the trees in (16). This is analogous to the way the early transforma-
tional grammars would not provide any account for speakers’ differing judgements 
regarding the ‘easy’/‘eager’ contrast if it were assumed that speakers grasped only 
the derived P-markers shown at the top of (10) and (11). Instead, the theory must be 
interpreted as claiming that speakers grasp the entire derivational process, includ-
ing specifications of what the D-structure phrase marker looked like and whether 
or not the relative clause was adjoined via a transformation that followed the wh-
movement of ‘which claim’: picture representations along the lines of (10) and (11) 
with D-structures at the bottom and the trees in (16) at the top, where one of the 
crucial transformations involves adding the relative clause to a post-wh-movement 
structure to produce (16a).
Note that the important point here is independent of whether Lebeaux’s analy-
sis is correct. What is significant is that there does not appear to have been any 
objection to the analysis based on the idea that since the crucial distinction is not 
encoded in the trees in (16), the theory cannot account for the contrast in judge-
ments in (15). If it were standardly assumed that final derived expressions10 were 
the objects that were grasped by speakers, then one would expect this objection to 
be raised. This kind of situation, where a derived expression underdetermines its 
10. Perhaps the point becomes even clearer in light of the fact that there is no single “final derived 
expression” in the GB system assumed by Lebeaux (1988). Grasping only the s-structure phrase 
marker would provide no encoding of, for example, the scope of covertly-moving expressions; 
and grasping only the LF phrase marker would provide no distinction between, for example, the 
wh-phrases that are pronounced in fronted positions and the wh-phrases that are pronounced in their 
base positions in English multiple wh-questions. The only reasonable interpretation of GB-style 
theories is to suppose that speakers grasp representations at all four levels — d-structure, s-struc-
ture, PF and LF — along with a history of the transformations that relate these four to each other.
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derivational history, becomes less likely in the context of the recent shift to adopt 
copies rather than traces as the residues of movement. In particular, the two exam-
ples just discussed would no longer provide clear evidence that derivations are the 
relevant objects if we update them in accord with these more modern assumptions: 
the derived structure for (15a) would encode the crucial distinction between early 
and late adjunction by having a copy of the wh-phrase with or without the adjunct 
in the low position; and the assumption that residues of movement can be deleted/
overwritten is (at best) difficult to reconcile with the idea that these residues are 
full-fledged copies, undermining the argument based on cyclicity. So we might ask 
whether, even if the derivational mindset that was clear in Miller and Chomsky 
(1963) was not abandoned with the introduction of traces in the 1970s, perhaps it 
was abandoned later with the introduction of copies.
But this also does not seem to be the case. For example, Lasnik (1999) raises 
the possibility that A-movement may not leave a copy, as an explanation for the 
fact that A-movement does not show reconstruction effects. As a consequence, 
the final derived expression would not encode the base positions of A-moved ele-
ments, and therefore could not be used to determine which theta roles they are 
assigned (or even whether they had been assigned theta roles, as the Theta Criterion 
or equivalent would require). Lasnik suggests instead that “θ-roles are ‘checked’ 
in the course of a derivation” (p. 207) — for this to amount to any account of why 
speakers interpret sentences involving A-movement in the ways that they do, the 
background assumption must be that they grasp a complete derivational history. 
This is certainly not an uncontroversial proposal, and Lasnik notes that it departs 
from Chomsky’s (1995) assumption that θ-roles are “determined specifically at 
the LF level” (i.e. in the final derived expression), but there is no sign that this 
departure requires an adjustment to the fundamental question of which objects are 
grasped by speakers. In fact Lasnik notes (p. 208) that his proposal can be seen as a 
direct descendent of the way the Standard Theory takes θ-assignment to be a “base 
property”, as illustrated with the ‘easy’/‘eager’ example above.
Another example can be seen in McCloskey’s (2002) account of certain facts 
involving complementizers in Irish. This proposal’s “core claim is that the morpho-
syntactic make-up of a head is influenced not by the syntactic material with which 
it is in a local relation, but rather by the mode of introduction of that material” 
(p. 202). Specifically, a C head is pronounced as ‘aL’ if its specifier was filled by 
an application of move, and as ‘aN’ if its specifier was filled by an application of 
merge (and as ‘go’ if its specifier is not filled). So inspecting the contents of the C 
head’s projection in the final derived expression will not suffice to determine which 
of these pronunciations is applicable for a given structure.11 McCloskey notes that 
11. This is perhaps not as clear a case as some of the earlier examples, because even though inspecting 
the C head’s projection will not provide the relevant information, inspecting the entire derived 
phrase marker will: if other copies of the phrase that fills the SpecCP position are present lower 
in the structure, then it will follow that the SpecCP position was filled by move. But McCloskey 
makes no mention of this and states the relevant criterion in terms of the derivational operations 
themselves. This would be surprising if he was working under the assumption that this information 
could be recovered only via inspection of copies.
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the proposal is unusual in this respect, but again there is no sign that he takes this 
novelty to involve an adjustment to our understanding of the fundamentals of what 
a syntactic derivation is.
A striking recent example of “nonmonotonic derivations” is Müller’s (2017) 
proposal of a derivational system that includes a removal operation, which deletes 
a projection from a phrase marker. The motivation for this is cases of apparent 
“conflicting representations”, where some diagnostics indicate that a certain ele-
ment is present and others indicate that it is absent; Müller proposes that in such 
situations, some diagnostics are revealing properties of the pre-removal structure 
and others are revealing properties of the post-removal structure. The question of 
whether passives include a syntactic representation of an external argument, for 
example, is treated this way. It is not immediately obvious whether this will cre-
ate situations where two importantly distinct derivations lead to a single derived 
structure, as in some of the cases discussed above — but it seems natural to assume 
that Müller intends for a derivation where a certain element is merged and then 
removed to be meaningfully different from any derivation where that element is 
never merged in the first place.12 This fits with the view that entire derivational 
histories are the central theoretical objects (Figure 2), but not with the view that 
final derived expressions suffice (Figure 1).
1.3.2. The rise of representational devices
Let us suppose, then, that the implicit assumption in contemporary minimalist 
syntax is still that speakers grasp entire derivations, in the manner that is straight-
forwardly necessary for the ‘easy’/‘eager’ contrast in (10) and (11). Why then have 
we seen such an increase in representational devices, which make this implicit 
assumption easier to overlook? If the reason for these developments was not a shift 
to a point of view more in line with Figure 1, where the final derived object encodes 
all grammatically relevant information by design, then what was the reason? To the 
extent that no other reason can be identified, the argument I made in the previous 
subsection would be weakened.
To be concrete: why is it that contemporary theories would assign derived 
structures something like those in (17) to the ‘easy’/‘eager’ sentences, rather than 
those shown at the top of (10) and (11)?
(17)  a. Johni is easy [ti PROarb to please ti]
 b. Johni is eager [PROi to please]
12. It is interesting, in light of the discussion in the next subsection, that Müller acknowledges (p. 27) 
that “structure removal may indeed lead to incompatibilities with the standard concept of trans-
parent logical forms as laid out, e.g., in Heim and Kratzer (1998)”, i.e. incompatibilities with the 
idea that semantics is computed from derived expressions, and suggests instead that the derivation 
tree (or T-marker) serves this purpose; cf. the discussion around (20) and (21) below. So Müller 
acknowledges that his proposal requires a departure from one dominant assumption about the object 
that serves as the basis of semantic interpretation (to which there are viable alternatives), but makes 
no mention of any required shift regarding the issue reflected in the choice between Figure 1 and 
Figure 2.
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Note that it is no answer to simply say that “We need a co-indexed PRO there in 
order to represent the fact that ‘John’ receives the subject theta role from ‘please’” 
— this begs the question, since we have seen that there are alternative, derivational 
ways of representing this information.
A problem that soon arose for the “purely deep structure” encoding of semantic 
information as in (10) and (11) was the fact that some transformations can affect 
semantic interpretation. For example, the passive transformation affects the relative 
scope of the two quantifiers in (18), and the raising of ‘every boy’ in (19a) affects 
the ability of this quantifier to bind the variable in ‘his’.13
(18) a. Everyone in this room knows two languages.
 b. Two languages are known by everyone in this room.
(19) a. [Every boy]i seems to hisi mother to be intelligent.
 b. *It seems to hisi mother that [every boy]i is intelligent.
Since such pairs of sentences are derived from pairs of D-structures that are 
equivalent in all relevant respects, it is not possible to maintain the view of the 
Standard Theory (Katz & Postal 1964; Chomsky 1965) that deep structures were 
the only objects relevant to semantic interpretation. Somehow the theory needed to 
allow semantic interpretation to be dependent on both D-structure, where thematic 
relations were encoded, and S-structure, where the scope of quantifiers and other 
operators was encoded; see e.g. van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986: 80-87) for dis-
cussion. The model of grammar based on this assumption that both D-structure and 
S-structure contributed to semantic interpretation became known as the Extended 
Standard Theory.
While the basic point that semantic interpretation depended on both D-structure 
and S-structure configurations is clear enough, it is less clear exactly how a system 
of compositional semantic rules might operate if it is to take two distinct trees as 
input. Logically speaking, there are two different ways in which things could be 
re-envisaged so as to provide a single object that encodes all semantically-relevant 
information “in one place”.
The first possibility is to take the input to semantics to be derivational histories 
rather than D-structures. The idea here would be to take each derivational operation 
to be associated with some particular compositional semantic rule, in the style of 
Montague (1974) and much subsequent work; in modern terminology this kind 
of approach is sometimes described as “directly compositional” (Barker & Jacobson 
2007). The raising transformation that applies in the derivation of (19a), for 
example, would affect the syntactic and semantic computations in parallel: it would 
displace the phrase ‘every boy’ into its matrix clause position on the syntactic side, 
and widen the scope of this phrase’s interpretation on the semantic side. Rather than 
13. See e.g. van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986: 83); Chomsky (1975: 97-98); Lasnik & Lohndal (2013: 
37). The contrast in (18) was in fact noted in Chomsky (1957: 100-101).
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a phrase marker such as D-structure or S-structure being the structure on which 
compositional rules would operate, a hierarchical description of the derivational 
history would serve this role. This kind of object is essentially what was depicted 
earlier in (10) and (11), but it suffices to only identify the transformations applied 
at the internal nodes, as in (20) and (21).
(20)  (21)
Such hierarchical objects were known as T-markers in early transformational 
grammar (see e.g. Chomsky 1965: 130). Given a semantic rule associated with 
each transformation, it would be possible to retrieve from these objects both the 
additional syntactic information that is represented explicitly in (10) and (11) and 
a semantic interpretation for the completed sentences.14 Kobele (2006, 2012) pro-
vides examples of what it would look like to apply this idea to a minimalist-style 
transformational grammar.
As it happened, however, this is not the way things proceeded. A second option 
was made possible by the introduction of traces: the input to semantic interpreta-
tion was taken to be not D-structure as in the Standard Theory, nor the derivation 
14. In fact there was some work pursuing exactly this idea before the Standard Theory assumption that 
only deep structure was relevant came to be adopted: “Suppose S has been constructed from a certain 
set of source sentences by the optional transformation T. A type 2 rule is a rule which operates on 
the semantic interpretations of these source sentences and on either the derived constituent structure 
characterization of S or on the transformation T in order to produce a semantic interpretation of S” 
(Katz & Fodor 1963: 206). This was a way to flesh out the assumption in Chomsky (1957) that the 
complete derivation was relevant to semantic interpretation: “In the earliest generative model, 
the interface is the T-marker, which includes all of the syntactic structures created in the course 
of the derivation. Subsequent models had the following interfaces with semantics: The Standard 
Theory had D-structure, the Extended Standard Theory had D-structure and S-structure” (Lasnik & 
Lohndal 2013: 39). The adoption of the Standard Theory assumption meant that meaning-changing 
transformations such as question-formation and negation, which were optional in the pre-Aspects 
framework, had to instead become obligatory transformations triggered by question and negation 
morphemes that were present at D-structure. These morphemes might be thought of as represen-
tational encodings of the “derivational future”, made necessary by the D-structure assumption, 
analogous to the way traces are representational encodings of the “derivational past”.
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as a whole as in the first option just outlined, but rather S-structure. The thematic 
information that was not available at S-structure in the Standard Theory could now 
be retrieved at that level via the traces left by transformations that moved things 
out of their thematic positions.15 This in turn subsequently developed into the idea 
that the input to semantic interpretation is an “even later” level of representation, 
namely LF, with traces (or copies) still encoding all positions that constituents had 
moved through in earlier stages of the derivation.
But importantly, the possibility of this approach to semantic interpretation was 
a by-product of the presence of traces, not a motivation for introducing traces:
The motivation for [traces] was that in important respects, movement gaps behave 
like positions that are lexically filled, an argument first made in Wasow (1972) and 
Chomsky (1973). 
(Lasnik & Lohndal 2013: 38)
The argument from Wasow (1972: 138-142) is that strong crossover violations 
such as (22a) can be accounted for by supposing that wh-movement leaves behind 
a trace that is an R-expression, such that the trace in (22a) violates Condition C in 
just the same way that ‘John’ does in (22b).
(22) a. *Whoi did hei say Mary kissed ti? 
 b. *Hei said Mary kissed Johni
The argument from Chomsky (1973: 265-267) is based on the need to rule out 
(23). Without a trace left behind by the raising of ‘John’, the theory under consid-
eration would have no way to prevent application of the rule that relates ‘the men’ 
to ‘each other’; but if a trace is left, then this is blocked by the Specified Subject 
Condition (SSC).
(23) *Johni seems to the men ti to like each other.
In slightly more neutral terms, the key observation here is that a clause does 
not become “subjectless” when its subject is moved out of it. (Lightfoot 1976: 560 
also presents this particular case as “the earliest motivation for introducing the 
notion of a trace”.)16
These two arguments are based on the idea that there must be “something there” 
in vacated positions: something to be constrained by Condition C (or equivalent) 
15. See van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986: 186), Chomsky (1975: 96), Lasnik & Lohndal (2013: 38). 
Actually, even the introduction of traces did not immediately make it entirely straightforward 
that thematic information could be recovered at S-structure because of the possibility that traces 
could be deleted or overwritten by subsequent transformations; see e.g. Fiengo (1977: 58-60) and 
Lightfoot (1976: 560, note 2) for some discussion.
16. Omer Preminger (p.c.) points out an additional roughly contemporaneous introduction of the idea: 
Baker & Brame (1972: 56) propose that transformational rules “may be restated in such a way that 
they leave a special feature or boundary symbol behind in the place formerly occupied by the moved 
constituent”, as a possible explanation for the much-discussed ‘wanna’-contraction paradigm.
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in (22a), and something to serve as a specified subject in (23). A slightly different 
kind of argument for traces concerned the relationship between a moved element 
and its trace:
The principal motivation for traces comes from the parallelism between movement 
structures and antecedent-anaphor relations. […]
Essentially, movement must always be to a c-commanding position and an anaphor 
must always be c-commanded by its antecedent. […]
we might say that a trace has anaphor properties and that the moved phrase has 
antecedent properties.
(van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986: 141-142)
And these two kinds of dependencies share not only the c-command require-
ment but also locality constraints: a single constraint is apparently blocking both 
movement and an anaphor-antecedent relation in (24), and a single constraint (per-
haps the same one) is apparently blocking both in (25) (van Riemsdijk & Williams 
1986: 143).
(24) a. *Johni was expected that ti would win
 b. *Johni expected that himselfi would win
(25) a. *Johni was expected Bill to kill ti
 b. *Johni expected Bill to kill himselfi
The core idea here is that conditions on the application of movement rules could 
be recast as conditions on the distribution of traces, and that “the distribution of 
trace at the level of surface structure follows from some quite natural conditions 
on bound anaphora” (Fiengo 1977: 53). The posited connections between move-
ment dependencies and antecedent-anaphor dependencies were developed further, 
to the point where the distinctive distributions of PRO, A-traces and Ā-traces were 
all accounted for to some large extent by the Binding Principles (Chomsky 1981, 
1986). And it was apparently very natural to understand the Binding Principles as 
representational constraints, since their canonical purpose was to constrain the dis-
tribution of various kinds of NPs which were taken at the time to be base-generated, 
rather than by-products of certain transformations. So when similarities were noted 
between, for example, the configurations in which reflexives could appear and the 
configurations in which raising was licit, the natural way to bring them under 
the same umbrella was to suppose that there is an A-trace at S-structure that is 
subject to the existing, representational constraint on the distribution of reflexives 
(i.e. some analog of Principle A).17
17. If analyses of reflexives as transformationally-derived, in the style of Lees and Klima (1963), had 
remained dominant throughout the intervening years, then it would perhaps have been less obvious 
that the unification had to proceed by bringing everything under a representational umbrella. The 
other natural alternative would have been to suppose that there is something important shared by 
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To the extent that this kind of logic drove the shift towards enriched representa-
tions, the shift had nothing to do with a preference for representational encodings of 
locality conditions, nor a preference for having a particular representational level as 
the input to semantic interpretation,18 nor with a preference for avoiding situations 
of the sort presented in section 1.3.1 where it must be assumed that speakers grasp 
derivational histories; rather it was simply an attempt to unify various primitives 
that had been empirically discovered to pattern together. If two things (reflexives 
and raising) behave alike and one (reflexives) is taken for granted to be constrained 
representationally, then it is natural to create a representational reflex of the other 
in order to bring the two into line.
Furthermore, the half of this scenario that was taken for granted to be represen-
tational in the 1980s is arguably no longer thought to be so. The general trend in 
minimalist syntax has been to try to derive the effects of earlier representational 
constraints, such as Principle A, from derivational constraints on merge and/or 
move, such as some version of a Shortest Move condition (e.g. Hornstein 1999, 
2001; Kayne, 2002). Very broadly speaking: a derivational explanation of the 
ungrammaticality of (26a), based on the fact that it involves a movement step that 
goes too far, would most likely be more in keeping with contemporary thinking 
than would a representational explanation of the ungrammaticality of (26b), based 
on the fact that it involves a trace/copy that is not appropriately bound/licensed.
(26) a. *Johni thinks that Mary likes himselfi
 b. *John is likely that it seems to be tall
If indeed the locality constraints on raising, for example, are nowadays to be 
explained via minimality-style limits on the applicability of movement transforma-
tions, nothing would be lost by reverting to a system which, like 1960s transfor-
mational grammars, has no traces or copies left by raising: the traces/copies are 
no longer of any relevance to Principle A. (And recall that “we need a co-indexed 
silent element there in order to encode the theta role that ‘John’ received in its 
the derivational operation that establishes reflexive-antecedent pairs and the derivational operation 
that implements raising. (Indeed the Chomsky 1973 argument based on (23) still assumed a deriva-
tionally-established relationship between ‘each other’ and its antecedent.) While these two kinds of 
dependencies were in fact unified under a representational umbrella in the GB era, minimalist theories 
arguably tend more towards unifying them derivationally; see discussion surrounding (26) below.
18. Admittedly, the idea that traces would allow for interpretation to depend only on surface structure 
quickly became appealing in itself. Lightfoot (1976: 560) writes that “The earliest motivation for 
introducing the notion of a trace was the desire to employ the Specified Subject Condition [in (23)] 
But much of the subsequent appeal of the theory seems to lie in the claim that it yields exactly the 
right information to support semantic interpretation at the level of surface structure”; Lightfoot 
goes on to argue for the “pluralist” view of traces that takes them (as I do here) to be independently 
syntactically motivated with the semantic consequences as a by-product, over the “exclusively 
semantic” view that takes them to be motived only by the requirement of semantic interpretation. 
Chomsky (1975: 97) goes as far as to say that “The original motivation for the trace theory was 
in part that it facilitated semantic interpretation”, but still with the qualifier “in part”, and follows 
immediately with “But there were also independent considerations that led to the same theory”.
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base position” only begs the question — even if semantic interpretation cannot be 
computed from D-structure alone, directly compositional interpretation, discussed 
around (20) and (21) above, remains an option.) In other words, if this line of rea-
soning is correct, then we have roughly reverted to using derivational mechanisms 
to constrain both antecedent-anaphor dependencies and movement dependencies, 
as was the case before the introduction of traces; but despite the fact that traces 
were introduced with the aim of representationalizing those constraints (a purpose 
that they no longer serve), we have maintained the assumption that movement 
leaves some kind of representational residue. This representational residue is now 
redundant, like the tree structure in (7).19
So not only was the representational shift driven by empirical practicalities 
rather than architectural preferences, but the assumptions that made the shift practi-
cal in the 1970s and 1980s arguably no longer hold. If this analysis is correct, then 
it suggests that many of the representational encodings of derivational history in 
modern syntax — for example, the unpronounced copy left in the lower clause of 
a raising construction — are unnecessary. Put differently, we have a mixed system 
where there is a certain amount of redundancy, but it is arguably the representa-
tional aspects that are redundant, not the derivational ones.20
1.4. Interim summary
This section has had two aims. The first aim was to establish what it looks like 
for a theory of grammar to suppose that the objects being grasped by a speaker 
are derivations. This comes out most clearly in the case of systems like categorial 
grammar, but importantly there are also mixed systems that derive structured 
expressions (for example, trees) and yet also require this same derivational 
interpretation. The second aim was to argue that although it is no longer as clearly 
the case as it was in the early days of the 1960s, generative grammar has never 
ceased to be a system of the mixed kind that takes derivations themselves to be 
19. General requirements such as The Projection Principle (Chomsky 1981) and the No Tampering 
Condition (Chomsky 2005, 2007) can be seen as wide-ranging expressions of the trend towards a 
stronger and stronger commitment to the idea that derivational operations must preserve informa-
tion from earlier stages. Notice that these are virtually names for the requirement that information 
is preserved, not arguments for the adoption of systems that satisfy this requirement. For example, 
discussions of the Projection Principle often point out that it forces or derives the presence of trac-
es in positions vacated by movement (e.g. Chomsky 1981: 30; van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986: 
252; Lasnik & Uriagereka 1988: 28), but this says nothing about whether the presence of traces is 
something that we should want in the first place. Requiring that information is preserved seems to 
inevitably lead in exactly the direction of redundant mixed theories, i.e. towards theories where 
earlier derivational stages are genuinely dispensible as in (7), inviting the view in Figure 1. The 
motivation for moving in this direction remains unclear to me.
20. Brody (2002) observes the same redundancy, but argues to eliminate it in the opposite way: switch-
ing to a completely representational theory, where the idea would be that both (26a) and (26b) 
should be ruled out by representational constraints in roughly the manner of GB systems. The 
purpose of this paper is only to explore the option that retains derivations, since this seems like a 
less drastic departure from contemporary mainstream thinking, so I leave aside proper consideration 
of the relative merits of this option versus the alternative that Brody proposes.
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the objects to be grasped by speakers. The instances where this can be seen have 
become rarer over the years for unrelated empirical reasons (which arguably are less 
relevant now than they were in the GB era), but certain specific well-known points 
in the literature make it clear that this is still the intended interpretation. If we accept 
this conclusion about the cognitive commitments of modern generative grammar, 
then we should expect that in principle there will be ways to empirically distinguish 
theories on the basis of their derivational claims — not the claims they make about 
derived expressions (for example, which ones are well-formed and which ones have 
which particular interpretations), but the claims they make about the derivational 
processes of which those expressions are the end result. My goal in the rest of this 
paper is to show one way of cashing out these claims. To sharpen the issue, I will 
consider two versions of the theory that differ only in their derivational processes: 
the set of expressions derivable by the two are identical (as are their classifications 
of which expressions are grammatical, and which have certain interpretations, etc.).
2. A derivational theory of minimalist syntax (or two)
In this section I will present two minimally-different versions of minimalist syntax. 
The two versions agree entirely on the set of derivable final expressions, and dif-
fer only in the derivational processes that are taken to construct those expressions. 
Specifically, in one version merge and move are two distinct primitive structure-
building operations, and in the other the structure-building functionality of merge 
and move is abstracted out into a single primitive operation.
If the final derived expressions are all that play a part in the cognitive claims 
of a grammatical theory, then these two versions of the theory will obviously be 
empirically indistinguishable. I have shown in the previous section that, in occa-
sional cases, the derivational properties of a theory (i.e. the fact that speakers grasp 
complete derivations) are relied upon in an account of acceptability facts of the 
sort standardly used in syntactic research — and therefore, that it is reasonable 
(and indeed necessary, if existing arguments in the syntactic literature are to be 
taken seriously) to suppose that speakers grasp complete derivations. Here I hope 
to show that other empirical measures can also be sensitive to the derivational 
properties of a theory. In other words, the contributions of derivational processes to 
accounts of acceptability facts are not an artifact of some peculiarities of the ways 
in which grammars relate to acceptability judgements; they are a part of the quite 
general claims that are made by positing a generative grammar as a component of a 
speaker’s mind. As I will show in Section 3, the two versions of minimalist syntax 
that I introduce here can (in combination with reasonable linking hypotheses) make 
distinct empirical predictions about sentence comprehension difficulty phenomena 
and about the choices a learner will make between candidate grammars.
2.1. Merge and move as distinct primitives
I will start by presenting a relatively standard version of minimalist syntax in this 
section (essentially following Stabler 1997, 2011), from a perspective that empha-
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sizes the place of derivations in the sense outlined in Section 1. In Section 2.2 I 
will present the derivationally-distinct alternative by highlighting the ways it differs 
from the system introduced here.
As an example, consider the derivational process underlying (27). Here and 
throughout this section I will ignore head movement: for simplicity, I will sup-
pose that this is a simple wh-question in a language much like English, but lacking 
auxiliary inversion (or alternatively, an embedded question in English). I will also 
make a number of simplifying assumptions about the particulars of clause structure 
(e.g. ignoring the TP layer).
(27) what John eats
In particular, consider the expression that has been derived immediately pre-
ceding the final wh-movement step: the wh-phrase is in the direct object position, 
but has an unchecked feature indicating that it must move to another position for 
the derivation to be valid. I will represent this by labeling the phrase DP[-wh] (as 
opposed to simply DP). In addition, to highlight the way phrases with unchecked 
features have “unfinished business” that needs to be completed by some subsequent 
derivational step (in contrast to the way the DP ‘John’, for example, has done eve-
rything it needs to do), I will adopt a notation for tree structures where phrases with 
these unfulfilled requirements stand out visually, as shown on the right in (28). It 
bears emphasizing that this unusual graphical convention says nothing more than 
what was already said by annotating the ‘what’ node with an unchecked -wh fea-
ture in the more conventional diagram on the left in (28). It is no departure from 
standard minimalist assumptions. I adopt it here only because it will help to clarify 
the relationship between the two subtly different derivational implementations of 
movement that I am introducing in this section.
(28)
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Adopting the notational conventions from Section 1, I will represent the full 
derivation of ‘what John eats’ as shown in Figure 6. The tree in Figure 6 should 
be thought of as an encapsulation of a derivational history in much the same way 
as (10) and (11) above (on page 102).21 A few specific points are worth noting.
First, notice that as soon as ‘eats’ and ‘what’ are merged, we have a structure 
where one component has “unfinished business” in the sense introduced above, and 
therefore the tree structure containing only these two words already shows ‘what’ 
set aside in the manner introduced in (28).
Second, notice that the step that combines ‘eats what’ with ‘John’ is shown 
with the former on the left and the subject on the right in the derivation structure. 
This has nothing to do with the eventual linear order of these two constituents, nor 
with the order in which they appear in the resulting derived VP structure, shown 
immediately above. It simply records the fact that ‘eats what’ is the “selector” 
(here, more specifically, theta-assigner) and ‘John’ is the “selectee” (here, more 
specifically, theta-assignee), and as the rest of the tree makes clear, merge steps 
are recorded with the selector, or the element which projects, on the left (e.g. ‘eats’ 
and the null C head) and the selectee on the right (e.g. ‘what’ and the completed 
VP). Although no ambiguity would arise if this convention were not maintained, 
I will do things this way in order to bring out the distinction between the structure 
of the derivation (what combines with what, indicated by the thick arrows) and the 
structure of the derived expressions.
Third, the final step of the derivation is a move step. This is a unary operation, 
which takes one derived expression as its input to produce a new derived expres-
sion — in contrast to a binary operation such as merge, which takes two derived 
expressions as input — much like the unary transformation that fronts ‘John’ in 
the final step of the derivation shown in (10). After this move step, ‘what’ has no 
remaining unchecked features and therefore is shown having settled fully into its 
final position in the derived tree. For expository purposes, I am assuming, some-
what unconventionally, that no copy or trace is left in object position. Nothing 
significant would change if a copy were shown in the final derived tree, but my 
choice here is intended as a reminder that the final derived expression does not in 
general uniquely determine a history of derivational operations (even if it would 
in most theories’ analyses of this particular simple sentence). If we do things this 
way, then the fact that ‘what’ bears the object theta role is encoded by the earlier 
derivational steps rather than in the final derived expression, just as was the case 
for the fact that ‘John’ is the underlying object in (10); and in addition, to take but 
one example, strong crossover will need to be stated as a derivational constraint 
on wh-movement rather than by supposing that the residue of wh-movement is 
an R-expression constrained by Condition C. Whatever the explanatory virtues of 
21. One difference is that the trees in (10) and (11) showed only the transformational part of the der-
ivations of the relevant sentences, ignoring the base component’s construction of the underlying 
P-markers, and therefore show tree structures at the leaves of the derivation. The tree in Figure 6, 
in contrast, shows primitive lexical items at the leaves, since all structure-building is performed 
by generalized transformations in this system.
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Figure 6. The full derivation of ‘what John eats’.
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assimilating strong crossover to Condition C by including some residue of ‘what’ in 
the final derived expression in Figure 6, however, the motivation behind my choice 
is, to repeat, simply to provide a reminder that derivational histories are sometimes 
relied upon as the sole record of certain pieces of information. Recall, for example, 
Lasnik’s (1999) suggestion that A-movement leaves no copies, which, whatever its 
pros and cons, is not taken to make it impossible to enforce the requirement that 
all DPs receive theta roles. My choice to not show copies is simply a reminder of 
those sorts of possibilities.
2.2. A single structure-building operation
I will turn now to the alternative derivational procedure that generates the same 
range of derived expressions as the system just outlined in Section 2.1.
Recall that when subconstituents of a tree have unchecked features that require 
future movement operations, I have drawn these subconstituents below the rest 
of the tree, as illustrated in (28) — intuitively, one can think of them as waiting 
in a kind of buffer or “holding zone” for the opportunity to fulfill their remaining 
combinatory requirements. It is this holding zone, naturally enough, that movement 
operations draw on when, for example, a C′ constituent has been constructed whose 
head bears a +wh feature and can therefore check the -wh feature of a waiting 
phrase, as shown in the last step of Figure 6.
The idea behind the unification of merge and move into a single structure-
building operation, as I will implement it here, is to suppose that not only move 
but also merge draws on this same “holding zone”. So it will not only hold phrases 
that are waiting to move into certain structural positions, but also phrases that are 
waiting to merge into certain structural positions. It is the shared use of this holding 
zone that unifies all instances of structure-building in this system, which departs 
somewhat from standard intuitions regarding the unification of merge and move 
(the latter being an instance of the former, perhaps in combination with copy); see 
Hunter (2011) for much discussion, drawing on Stabler (2006). But for present 
purposes all that is important is that it provides a minimally-different conception 
of the derivational processes that produce the same range of derived expressions 
as the more standard system introduced above — and one that has been formu-
lated explicitly enough to (i) allow us to be certain that the two systems do indeed 
generate the same range of derived expressions, and (ii) allow us to integrate both 
systems into models of parsing and learning to conduct the kind of tests that will 
follow in Section 3.
To illustrate, consider the derivational steps that combine the verb ‘eats’ with 
its two arguments. For each argument, the effects of what was previously the 
merge step that introduced it and combined it with (a projection of) ‘eats’ are now 
achieved by two distinct derivational operations in succession: the first of which 
I will call insert, and the second of which I will call build. The build operation 
is the one that is a generalized version of both merge and move from above; the 
insert operation takes up the slack of the extra book-keeping that is created by this 
unification. What insert does is introduce new material into an expression without 
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fulfilling any of this new material’s requirements; for example, (29) shows a small 
part of a derivation, the first step of which is an insert step that introduces ‘what’ 
into the derivation without putting it into a position that fulfills its requirement 
of a theta role. Instead, it is simply placed in the “holding zone” shown at the 
bottom of these boxed expressions. This corresponds to the fact that at this point 
‘what’ certainly has unfinished business, in fact two kinds of unfinished business 
(because it has not even “started business”): both the establishment of a theta role 
and the requirement to move into an operator position remain to be completed. 
The second step shown in (29) is a build step. The build operation is essentially 
identical to the move operation as presented in Section 2.1: it draws on material 
waiting in the holding zone, to establish dependencies required by the “main part” 
of the expression, shown at the top of the thick boxes. The sense in which this 
system unifies merge and move is that both “first merge” and “re-merge” involve 
the build operation, drawing something from this holding zone. After the build step 
establishes its thematic dependency with ‘eat’, ‘what’ still has unfinished business 
in just the same sense that was discussed earlier, namely the requirement encoded 
by the -wh feature, so it remains held out, waiting for an opportunity to fulfill this 
final requirement. The holding zone contains elements that have one or more as-
yet-unfulfilled requirements.
The next two derivational steps are shown in (30). These two steps are another 
insert-build “pair” that together have the effect of what was a single merge step in 
the system of Section 2.1. Here it is ‘John’ that is first added, without having any 
dependencies established, by an insert step, and then subsequently drawn on by 
build to establish the necessary external theta role dependency. In the intermediate 
derived expression in (30), ‘John’ is shown in the holding zone just as ‘what’ was 
in the intermediate derived expression in (29). But unlike ‘what’, ‘John’ has no 
further business to conduct beyond thematic requirements, and so after the build 
step in (30) it is shown fully settled into its final position.
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(29)  (30)  (31) 
     
After a third insert-build pair of steps (corresponding to the third merge step 
of the derivation shown in Figure 6) that combines the C head with its completed 
VP complement, the derivation of ‘what John eats’ ends with the build step shown 
in (31). Note that although this build step corresponds to what was previously a 
move step, it is not formally different from any of the previous build steps that 
corresponded to (parts of) merge steps: it establishes a dependency between an ele-
ment waiting on the holding zone and the head of the main tree. If the waiting 
element has further requirements that remain unfulfilled after a build step, then it 
remains in the holding zone to await a future build step that will satisfy the next of 
its further requirements, as in the build step at the top of (29); if it does not, then 
it will not need to participate in any further derivational operations and is fully 
integrated into the tree, as in the build steps at the top of (30) and (31).
I will call the system introduced here Insertion Minimalist Grammars (IMGs), 
in contrast to the more standard system in Section 2.1 which I will call Minimalist 
Grammars (MGs). This terminology follows the technical literature where more 
details of these two systems and the relationship between them can be found; see 
for example Stabler (2011, 2006); Hunter (2011).
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2.3. Interim summary
Notice that the final expression derived by the IMG in (31) is identical to the 
final expression derived by the MG in Figure 6. It should be intuitively clear that 
any expression that can be derived by one of these systems can be derived by 
the other, but also that the structure of the two corresponding derivations will be 
slightly different. Given the conclusions reached in Section 1, this means that the 
two theories make distinct claims about the objects that are grasped by speak-
ers — they are therefore just as distinct as two representational theories that posit 
structurally different representations.
Full derivation tree structures of the sort shown in Figure 6 for an MG are 
unwieldy, and even more so for IMGs. An alternative notation that allows for a 
more direct comparison between the two systems labels the internal nodes of deri-
vation trees simply with the name of the operation that applies at the corresponding 
derivational step, as in (20) and (21) above. This loses no information, because all 
of the derivational operations we are considering here are functions: if we know that 
merge applied to ‘eat’ and ‘what’, for example, then we have all the information 
we need to work out what the resulting derived expressions is. So to save space, we 
can represent the MG derivation from Figure 6 much more compactly as shown in 
(32); for comparison, the corresponding IMG derivation (previously shown only 
partially and piecemeal in (29), (30) and (31)) can be represented as shown in (33). 
To repeat, these are analogous to the “T-markers” of early transformation theory; 
see e.g. Chomsky (1965: 130).
(32)
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(33)
3. The empirical reflexes of derivational processes
I now turn to the task of demonstrating that, in two simple case studies, there are 
empirical consequences to the choice between (i) supposing that the expression 
shown in (34) is derived by the combination of merge and move steps shown in 
(32), as the MG theory would have it, and (ii) supposing that it is derived by the 
combination of insert and build steps shown in (33), as the IMG theory would 
have it.
(34)
Specifically, I will show that it is possible to put together a chain of linking 
hypotheses to produce the result that these two proposals make distinct predic-
tions — holding all other factors fixed — with regard to sentence comprehension 
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difficulty and with regard to the choices a learner will make among a given range 
of grammars.
If it is shown that these two theories can make empirically-distinguishable 
cognitive claims, then it should be clear that the “empirical payload” of a grammati-
cal theory should not in general exclude the derivational properties of that theory: 
in other words, Figure 2, rather than Figure 1, more accurately characterizes the 
cognitive claims of a derivational theory.
This general point, of course, has nothing specifically to do with, for example, 
the two particular derivational systems I am considering here, or with the virtues 
of the idea of unifying merge and move, or with the degree to which the approach I 
have taken to this unification is in line with other proposals in the syntax literature. 
These two systems just provide a simple setting for tackling the abstract problem of 
relating derivational processes to various kinds of empirical predictions. Similarly, 
the details of the two case studies that follow — for example, the use of surprisal 
as a complexity metric, or the use of maximum likelihood estimation on the part of 
a learner — are also independent of the main concerns here. Some such assump-
tions, and some collection of linking hypotheses, must be chosen in order to make 
the questions concrete; replacing the choices I have made with others would no 
doubt change the empirical predictions that I derive, but would leave unaffected 
the broader point that such empirical predictions can be derived.
3.1. A probability model
In many of the cases where grammars play a part in some cognitive model, they do 
so by being supplemented with probabilities. The two empirical domains that I will 
deal with in the case studies below are both instances of this: information-theoretic 
complexity metrics such as surprisal are computed as some function of a distribu-
tion over sentences, and probabilistic learning models often involve calculating the 
likelihood of the observed input relative to a certain hypothesized grammar in order 
to assess the fit of the grammar to these observations. One way for the predictions 
of such models to be sensitive to the distinction between MGs and IMGs, then, 
is for the probability distributions definable over the common set of generated 
expressions to be sensitive to this distinction. This is the approach that I adopt.22
In this section I will give a very brief overview of how to supplement grammars 
of the sort introduced in Section 2 with probabilities, in a way that produces differ-
ent results depending on whether one adopts an MG or an IMG that produces the 
same set of derived expressions. Readers who are ready to assume that this can be 
done can safely skip to Section 3.2; readers who would like more information on 
the technical details than is provided here should consult Hunter and Dyer (2013). 
But I should note that there are many possible ways to do this, all of which would 
produce different patterns of results in the case studies below, and no single “right 
way”. Attempting to justify taking any particular one of these as a valid linking 
22. See Hunter (to appear) for more discussion of the relationship between probability distributions 
and grammatical structure.
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hypothesis would run into the usual problems of many simultaneous unknowns, 
and is well beyond our current understanding (let alone the scope of this paper). 
Here I adopt one relatively natural option as a proof of concept.
A conventional, non-probabilistic grammar can be thought of as defining a 
space of probabilistic grammars, each of which defines a particular probability dis-
tribution over the objects generated by the original grammar. To add probabilities 
to a grammar — whether a simple context-free phrase structure grammar, or an 
MG, or an IMG — is therefore to choose from the space of associated probabilistic 
grammars, and in particular this is usually done by choosing values for some col-
lection of real-valued parameters. In the case of a CFG such as the one in (35), we 
can think of there being one parameter for each rule; these parameters are the λ1, 
λ2, etc. shown in (35). Then the task of choosing one of the many probabilistic ver-
sions of this grammar is the task of choosing values for the parameters λ1, λ2, etc.
(35) λ1 S → NP VP
 λ2  NP → John 
 λ3  NP → Mary 
 λ4  NP → D N
 λ5  VP → ran
 λ6  VP → walked
 λ7  D → the
 λ8  N → dog
 λ9 N → cat
How does fixing values for these parameters have the effect of attaching 
probabilities to the grammar’s rules (and, as a result, to its derivations)? There 
are many possibilities, but one standard way of doing things the probability of NP
rewriting as ‘John’, for example, is the value ; the probability of 
NP rewriting as ‘Mary’ is ; and the probability of VP rewriting as ‘ran’
is ; and so on. And the probability of a particular derivation in this 
grammar is the product of the probabilities of the rules that are used in the 
derivation.
Typically what we would like to do is to supplement an existing grammar 
G with probabilities (i.e. choose values for the parameters) in the manner that 
maximizes its degree of fit with some body of training data D. What does it mean 
to maximize degree of fit? Again there are many possibilities, but a common and 
simple answer is that we would like to choose values for the vector of parameters λ 
that maximizes the likelihood of the data D according to the probabilistic grammar 
Gλ (i.e. the grammar supplemented with probabilities according to λ). This is known 
as maximum-likelihood training since the quantity it maximizes is the likelihood 
P(D|Gλ). In the case of a CFG, this is a relatively simple process: if one sets the 
parameter λ2 to be the number of times that NP rewrites as ‘John’ in the training 
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corpus, and sets the parameter λ5 to be the number of times that VP rewrites as 
‘ran’ in the training corpus, etc., then one arrives at the values of these parameters 
that maximize this likelihood.23
Due to a formal property of MGs established by Michaelis (2001), it turns out 
that a broadly similar strategy to the one just outlined can be adopted for supple-
menting MGs (and also IMGs) with probabilities. The range of possible derivations 
in these grammars can be characterized via a branching process that has exactly the 
same structure as a context-free grammar; the relationship between this branching 
process and the surface strings (and indeed the surface tree structures) generated 
by the grammar is more complex and less transparent in the case of MGs than it 
is for CFGs, but this difference is irrelevant to the task of defining a probability 
distribution over the objects that a grammar generates. Hale (2006) made use of 
this fact to supplement MGs with probabilities.
What this underlyingly context-free branching process provides is a characteriza-
tion of what the “choice points” are that a machine would encounter when carrying 
out possible derivations licensed by the grammar, and what the competing candi-
date options are at each point: this corresponds to knowing, in the case of the CFG 
above, that there are points where you need to decide between ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ 
and ‘D N’ as the expansion of NP, and there are points where you need to decide 
between ‘ran’ and ‘walked’ as the expansion of VP, etc. In a CFG, any particular 
grammatical rule only ever enters into consideration at one such choice point: if a 
rule’s left-hand side is NP, then it enters into consideration at the choice point cor-
responding to deciding how to rewrite the symbol NP, and no others. But in an MG 
or an IMG, the relationship between the choice points and the grammatical rules is 
more complex. There are various ways in which one might flesh out the notion of a 
“grammatical rule” in these systems. Following Hunter & Dyer (2013), I will sup-
pose that grammatical rules are roughly things like “merge to assign a theta role” or 
“move to check a -wh feature” (in an MG) or “build to check a -wh feature” (in an 
IMG) — for other reasonable choices, the fact remains that the relationship between 
choice points and grammatical rules is complex and many-to-many.
Given this assumption about what we take to be the rules that the grammar is 
trafficking in, it is natural — although, as noted above, there is no single “right 
way” to do this — to design a probability model where the parameters have inter-
pretations that relate to notions like merge steps, move steps, theta roles, wh-fea-
tures, build steps and insert steps. Broadly speaking, the parameter λ2 in (35) is a 
measure of “how much NP gets rewritten as ‘John’”, λ5 is a measure of “how much 
VP gets rewritten as ‘ran’”, etc.; and accordingly training data is taken to provide 
information about “how much NP gets rewritten as ‘John’”, etc. So the model pro-
posed for MGs by Hunter & Dyer (2013) includes parameters that are measures of 
“how much merge happens”, “how much wh features get checked”, “how much 
move happens”, etc.; and for IMGs, there are measures of “how much build hap-
23. And this has the effect, of course, that the probability of VP rewriting as ‘ran’ will be the number 
of times that VP rewrote as ‘ran’ in the training corpus (i.e. λ5), divided by the number of times VP 
rewrote at all in the training corpus (i.e. λ5 + λ6).
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pens”, “how much insert happens”, etc. The relationship between these parameters 
and the probabilities that are multiplied together to determine the probability of 
entire derivation is complex (more complex than it is for CFGs), for precisely the 
reason that the relationship between the grammatical rules and the choice points 
is overlapping and complex.
These complications aside, the model has the same form as the one explicated 
for CFGs above in that (i) it involves a choice of parameter values, which in 
turn determine probabilities, and (ii) one can use a training corpus to choose the 
parameter values λ that maximize the value P(D|Gλ). What differs is that in the case 
of an MG, choosing parameter values can be interpreted as answering questions 
about “how much merge happens” (for the parameter λmerge) and “how much 
move happens” (for the parameter λmove), whereas in the CFG the questions being 
answered include “how much NP rewrites as ‘John’” (for the parameter λ2, which 
could also have been called λNP → John). And, crucially, in the case of an IMG the 
parameter values being chosen during training are different again: they correspond 
to answering questions about “how much build happens” (λbuild), “how much insert 
happens” (λinsert), etc.24 The answers that a given body of training data provides to 
the MG-based questions about merge and move steps will in general be different 
from the answers that this same training data provides to the IMG-based questions 
about build and insert steps.
3.2. Case study: Sentence comprehension difficulty and surprisal
Surprisal is an information-theoretic complexity metric that has been hypothesized 
to predict human sentence comprehension difficulty (Hale 2001, 2016; Levy 2008). 
Given a probability distribution over sentences, and a particular sentence whose 
processing we are interested in, a surprisal value is defined for each word in the sen-
tence. This sequence of values is taken to represent the difficulty of integrating the 
information provided by each word as the sentence is read or heard incrementally.
Specifically, given the sentence w1w2 … wn, the surprisal at word wi is
− log P(Wi = wi|W1 = w1,W2 = w2, … ,Wi−1 = wi−1)
The probability here is simply the probability of encountering the word wi in 
that position, given all the preceding context. The negative logarithm is a monotonic 
decreasing function, and therefore has the effect of converting high probabilities to 
low surprisal values, and converting low probabilities into high surprisal values.
24. So I am making an assumption here that hypothesized derivational operations correspond in this 
direct way to parameters of the relevant probability models, which is of course not necessary. In 
particular, if one takes the differences between MGs and IMGs to be so small that they are nota-
tional variants, then the two probabilistic systems I am setting up will look like distinct parame-
terizations of a single derivational system, rather than the results of applying a single parameter-
ization choice to two distinct systems. But the more general point I want to make is that, whatever 
derivational distinctions one takes to be big enough that they “should matter”, tying parameters of 
probability distributions to those distinctions is one natural way to make them matter.
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In the concrete case that I am presenting here, I will work with grammars 
generating all and only the sentences shown in (36):
(36)  boys will shave
 boys will shave themselves 
 who will shave
 who will shave themselves 
 some boys will shave
 some boys will shave themselves
I make relatively obvious (i.e. English-like) assumptions about the structures 
of these sentences. The one somewhat unusual aspect of the analyses I adopt is 
that reflexives are generated via a doubling-style movement theory: in ‘boys will 
shave themselves’, for example, it is ‘boys themselves’ that combines as the object 
of ‘shave’, and ‘boys’ then moves up to the SpecTP position. (This is in order to 
maximize the number of “merge versus move” choices while keep the derivations 
as small as possible overall.)
Given a common lexicon where the words that appear in these sentences are 
annotated with appropriate features, I will consider the relationship between the 
MG that generates (36) and the IMG that generates this very same set of sentences. 
Notice that in addition to generating the same set of strings, these grammars imple-
ment the same analyses of these strings. By this I mean that the two grammars make 
all the same assumptions about “what goes where” in the course of the derivation 
— they differ only in whether these same interactions among words and phrases 
are effected by merge and move steps or by insert and build steps.
Suppose we adopt the following (artificial, and entirely arbitrary) “corpus” as 
the training data that will provide the basis for choosing probabilistic versions of 
our two grammars. The number at the beginning of each line is the frequency of the 
sentence in the training data.
(37) 10 boys will shave
  2 boys will shave themselves
  3 who will shave
  1 who will shave themselves
  5 some boys will shave
For the reasons outlined above, this training data will be “interpreted” differ-
ently depending on whether one is using it to train the MG or the IMG. As a train-
ing corpus for adding probabilities to the MG that generates the sentences in (36), 
it is a collection of merge and move events that provide a basis for estimating the 
parameters λmerge and λmove (as well as the others that relate to specific features). 
Choosing a value for each of these MG-based parameters picks out a particular 
probabilistic MG, which in turn defines a particular probability distribution over 
the set of sentences in (36). The values of these MG-based parameters that this 
training corpus leads to pick out a probabilistic MG that defines the following 
distribution:
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(38) 0.35478 boys will shave
 0.35478 some boys will shave
 0.14801 who will shave
 0.05022 boys will shave themselves
 0.05022 some boys will shave themselves
 0.04199 who will shave themselves
From the perspective of the corresponding IMG, however, the training corpus 
provides a basis for estimating the parameters λinsert and λbuild (as well as the others 
that relate to specific features). The probabilistic IMG that is picked out by using 
the same training corpus to estimate the values of these parameters defines the fol-
lowing, distinct, distribution over the same set of sentences:
(39) 0.35721 boys will shave
 0.35721 some boys will shave
 0.095 who will shave
 0.095 who will shave themselves
 0.04779 boys will shave themselves
 0.04779 some boys will shave themselves
Note that even the one sentence that was not in the training corpus, ‘some boys 
will shave themselves’, is assigned different probabilities by the two grammars. 
Although the two grammars assign the same analyses to all six sentences, the 
information provided by the common training corpus bears on the probability of 
this unseen sentence differently depending on whether one adopts the MG-based 
or IMG-based probability model.
From here it is a simple final step to complete the picture: calculations of sur-
prisal values for ‘who will shave themselves’ derived from the MG-based distribu-
tion are shown in (40), and the corresponding calculations using the IMG-based 
distribution are shown in (41). (I have chosen this sentence because it shows a rela-
tively striking difference, but the same point could be made with any of the other 
sentences.) The surprisal values, and therefore the predicted degrees of sentence 
comprehension difficulty, differ.
(40) surprisal at ‘who’ = − log P(W1 = who)
  = − log(0.15 + 0.04)
  = − log 0.19
  = 2.4
 surprisal at ‘themselves’ = − log P(W4 = themselves | W1 = who, … )
   0.04
  = − log 0.15 + 0.04
  = − log 0.21
  = 2.2
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(41)  surprisal at ‘who’ = − log P(W1 = who)
  = − log(0.10 + 0.10)
  = − log 0.2
  = 2.3
 surprisal at ‘themselves’ = − log P(W4 = themselves | W1 = who, …)
   0.10
  = − log 0.10 + 0.10
  = − log 0.5
  = 1
To recap: I took it as given that the language of the speaker(s) of interest con-
sists of precisely the set of sentences in (36), and moreover held fixed a particular 
analysis of each of those sentences (e.g. the assumption that reflexives are created 
by movement, that ‘who’ moves to SpecCP, etc.). Against the backdrop of these 
fixed assumptions, we would like to know whether the mental grammar of the 
speaker(s) of interest is the MG that expresses those analyses in terms of merge and 
move steps, or the corresponding IMG that expresses those same analyses in insert 
and build steps. What the calculations above show is that an experiment where we 
measure the difficulty that our speaker of interest encounters in incrementally read-
ing a sentence can provide data that — via linking assumptions which, as usual, 
would need to be independently justified — bears on this question. Concretely, if 
we suppose that the speaker’s probabilistic knowledge of language is informed by 
the pattern in (37) — based on, for example, the fact that this is data we collected 
from newspaper articles that are representative of the speaker’s linguistic experi-
ence — then our setup would predict roughly equal comprehension difficulty at the 
first and last words of ‘who will shave themselves’ if the speaker’s mental grammar 
is the MG, but significantly less comprehension difficulty at the last word than at 
the first if the speaker’s mental grammar is the corresponding IMG.
3.3. Case study: Grammar selection
In this section, I will consider a very simple model of grammar selection by a 
learner. It will be useful to begin with the specifics of the (artificial) learning prob-
lem that the model learner will confront, before returning to the details of the forms 
of particular grammars and the differences between MGs and IMGs.
The learner I will consider must choose between two grammars, Gdet and Gwh. 
Both grammars generate the same set of surface strings, although they assign dif-
ferent structures to some of these strings. The common set of surface strings is 
shown in (42).
(42) boys will shave
 boys will shave themselves 
 who will shave
 who will shave themselves
 foo boys will shave
 foo boys will shave themselves
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Where the two grammars differ is in their treatment of the word ‘foo’. In Gdet, 
this word is a determiner, as shown in the tree on the left in (43). (Gdet corresponds 
to the grammar that was used in the previous case study, with the string ‘foo’ in 
place of ‘some’.) In Gwh, this word is a wh-phrase base-generated in SpecCP (in 
line with certain proposals about words like ‘why’ and ‘how’), as shown on the 
right in (43).
(43)
The learner will be provided with some training data, on the basis of which 
to decide between these two analyses. The training data will be some collection 
of tokens of the sentences in (42), all of which are generated by both grammars. 
In order to decide whether Gdet or Gwh best fits the data, the learner will have to 
consider which grammar can best capture the statistical properties of the training 
corpus.
One way to tackle this problem builds directly on the kind of training that 
was used in the previous case study. Let us suppose that supplementing gram-
mar Gdet with probabilities requires choosing values for parameters λ, and that 
supplementing grammar Gwh with probabilities requires choosing values for param-
eters µ. We know from above that the learner can discover which of the various 
probabilistic versions of Gdet best fits the data by choosing λ so as to maximize 
P(D|Gλdet); and similarly, the learner can choose a probabilistic version of Gwh by 
choosing µ so as to maximize P(D|Gµwh). Having thus identified the “winner” Gλdet 
amongst all the versions of Gdet and the “winner” Gµwh amongst all the versions of 
Gwh, the learner can pit these two winners against each other in a grand final by 
comparing P(D|Gλdet) with P(D| Gµwh): this is comparing the best that any version of 
Gdet can do with the best that any version of Gwh can do. If P(D|Gλdet) > P(D|Gµwh), 
then our learner will choose Gdet over Gwh.
Notice now that I have not said anything so far about whether Gdet and Gwh 
are MGs or IMGs. So we can consider two different instantiations of the learning 
scenario that has just been introduced: one where a learner must choose between 
two MGs, MGdet and MGwh, and one where a learner must choose between two 
IMGs, IMGdet and IMGwh. These two learners are “doing the same thing” — decid-
ing whether to analyze ‘foo’ as a determiner or as a wh-phrase — but one is using 
the MG system to do this and the other is using the IMG system instead. But I will 
show that these two learners can reach different conclusions about how to analyze 
this unknown word, even while the training data is held constant.
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As a first concrete example, consider the (artificial and arbitrary) “training 
corpus” in (44). As before, the numbers at the beginning of each line are token 
frequencies.
(44) 5 boys will shave
 5 boys will shave themselves
 5 who will shave
 5 who will shave themselves
 5 foo boys will shave
We have seen in the previous case study that the best-fitting probabilistic ver-
sion of MGdet can differ from the best-fitting probabilistic version of IMGdet, since 
the former is determined by setting values of parameters including λmerge and λmove 
but whereas the latter has parameters including λbuild and λinsert. For just the same 
reasons, the best-fitting probabilistic version of MGwh can differ from the best-
fitting probabilistic version of IMGwh — where the former has parameters µmerge 
and µmove, the latter has µbuild and µinsert. These two divergences mean that the 
determiner-versus-wh competition taking place in the MG setting may look very 
different from the determiner-versus-wh competition taking place in the IMG set-
ting. Specifically, it turns out that for the MG-based learner, the best likelihood 
attainable by some probabilistic version of MGdet is 75 times higher than the best 
likelihood attainable by some probabilistic version of MGwh; whereas for the IMG-
based learner confronted with the same choice, the best likelihood attainable under 
the determiner analysis is only 13.7 times higher than the best likelihood attainable 
under the wh-phrase analysis.
preference factor for determiner analysis with MGs = 
preference factor for determiner analysis with IMGs = 
The training corpus in (44) therefore provides much stronger evidence for the 
determiner analysis if the two competing analyses are seen through the lens of 
the MG framework, than it does if the competition is seen through the lens of the 
IMG framework. In the context of a more elaborate learning model (for example 
in combination with certain Bayesian priors), this means that it is possible that 
the training corpus in (44) could provide evidence that tips the scale in favour 
of the determiner analysis for an MG-based learner, but not for an IMG-based 
learner. This despite the fact that the decision in each case is the decision between 
the two tree structures in (43) — all that differs is whether these trees are taken to 
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be constructed by the derivational operations merge and move, or the derivational 
operations build and insert.
A more dramatic result is provided by the (equally arbitrary and artificial) 
training corpus in (45).
(45)  8 boys will shave
  1 boys will shave themselves
 12 who will shave
  1 who will shave themselves
  4 foo boys will shave
In this case, the consequences for the MG-based learner and the IMG-based 
learner differ not in degree (of preference for the determiner analysis), but in direc-
tion: MGdet beats MGwh in the MG-based determiner-versus-wh competition, but 
IMGwh beats IMGdet in the IMG-based determiner-versus-wh competition. In the 
MG-based scenario, the best likelihood attainable under the determiner analysis 
is 64900 times higher than the best attainable under the wh-phrase analysis; in the 
IMG-based scenario, however, this ratio is only 0.749.
preference factor for determiner analysis with MGs = 
preference factor for determiner analysis with IMGs = 
So even in the absence of other surrounding assumptions (e.g. Bayesian pri-
ors) to interact with, this training corpus will favour the determiner analysis for 
the MG-based learner, but favour the wh-phrase analysis for the IMG-based 
learner.
To recap: what has been demonstrated is that the choice between the two 
analyses of ‘foo’ shown in (43) can have a different outcome, depending on 
whether those analyses are expressed in MGs, with merge and move as distinct 
primitive operations, or in IMGs, with build as the single unified structure-building 
operation — all while holding fixed the training corpus and all other linking 
hypotheses.
4. Conclusion
My aim here has been to answer a question posed in the introduction: how (if 
at all) does the procedural component of a derivational theory contribute to the 
theory’s empirical bottom line? The central idea is that in derivational systems 
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we can identify a procedure that constructs a complex expression with a static, 
structured representation of the relations among certain expressions — much as 
we can identify the procedure “add x to y and then multiply the result by z” with 
the structured representation z × (x + y). This idea lets us formulate the hypothesis 
that this structured object, the derivation tree, is the object that is grasped by a 
speaker when using the corresponding sentence. This eliminates what sometimes 
appears to be almost a kind of category mismatch that arises when considering how 
derivational theories are to be cashed out as cognitive hypotheses, particularly as 
compared to representational theories (recall Figure 1 and Figure 2).
It is not immediately obvious, however, that it is sensible to interpret modern 
generative grammar in such a way that a structured representation of the deriva-
tion itself has this primary status: it is tempting to suspect that the derivational 
operations that lead up to a particular derived expression are redundant extra 
trimmings, and therefore that debates over these derivational operations them-
selves are debates without empirical grounding. I have argued that this is an illu-
sion based on a historical trend towards representational encodings of syntactic 
generalizations, which (i) was not motivated by, and therefore should be taken 
independently of, the discussions about the mental status of derivational opera-
tions, and (ii) is arguably beginning to reverse anyway. In support of the claim 
that this effect is illusory, I highlighted cases where standard syntactic practice 
is clearly incompatible with assuming that only final derived expressions are 
grasped.
It therefore follows that the choice of derivational operations posited by a 
theory has an effect on the structured object that a speaker is taken to grasp or 
retrieve upon using a sentence. This in turn means that two theories that differ in 
their choices of derivational operations — even if the two systems generate the 
same set of grammatical derived structures — will make distinct claims about 
speakers’ mental representations that can lead to distinct empirical predictions 
for models of speaker behaviour that include grammatical systems as one of their 
components. There are many ways that this could be done. I have illustrated the 
effect by taking the probabilistic enrichment of a grammar to be one locus of 
sensitivity to the entire object grasped (i.e. the entire derivation tree), since prob-
abilities are a part of many common models of behavioural tasks. Specifically, 
in the context of surprisal-based models of incremental sentence comprehension 
difficulty and of a simple maximum-likelihood-based learner, I showed that two 
grammars differing only in the derivational operations taken to be responsible 
for constructing a common set of grammatical structures make distinct empirical 
predictions.
In narrow terms, this serves as a demonstration that if we are confronted with 
two theories that differ only in their derivational claims, there are ways to go 
beyond the standard methodology of acceptability judgements in order to gather 
evidence that will distinguish them empirically. But in principle we need not wait 
until we are confronted by the need for such a tie-breaker before attempting to 
flesh out the empirical consequences of the derivational components of theories: 
the derivational aspects of a theory can be treated as a first-class component of 
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its empirical payload just as much as all aspects of the representation on the left 
of Figure 2 are. For psycholinguists, this perspective has the potential to promote 
more direct engagement with syntactic theory; for syntacticians, it promotes clari-
fied ways of understanding the relationship between derivational and representa-
tional ways to express generalizations.
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